The second limb has an intent element
On this page14
The second limb
Whoever knowingly and unlawfully makes, forges, or counterfeits any such key, or possesses any such mail lock or key with the intent unlawfully or improperly to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of the same.
Two different prohibitions in one sentence
Making, forging or counterfeiting, which is conduct. And possessing with an intent, which is conduct plus a state of mind.
The making branch is qualified twice
Knowingly and unlawfully. So neither an accident nor a lawful making is within it.
And the possession branch requires an intent
Unlawfully or improperly to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of the same. Possession on its own is not the offence as described.
Which is the structure of a great many criminal provisions
And it is worth noticing because a summary that drops the intent element describes a different and much broader offence.
Improperly is the unusual word
Unlawfully or improperly, which are not the same. Improperly is broader and softer and sits alongside unlawfully rather than inside it.
Any such key refers back to the first limb
So the narrow category carries through: the keys in question are those described in the first part of the section.
And any such mail lock extends it to the lock
Which is the only place the section reaches the lock itself rather than the key.
Nothing in it reaches a container
There is no marking requirement, no labeling requirement and no packaging requirement anywhere in the section.
Which is the point of quoting it
To show that the federal provision naming a key is about a crime, so the container question is genuinely separate.
And nothing here applies it to anybody
Whether any conduct falls within either limb is not determined on these pages and is not a packaging question.
Nor does anything here assist in defeating a lock
Which is a line this property does not approach, on a page about lock parts.
The remaining five sections are about jars
Which is the honest division for a group whose federal law is a theft statute.